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Abstract
In this paper, we study the effect of financial markets on the invest-
ment of a two-good two-country economy with stochastic production
in a dynamic framework. Each country produces and invests only
one good and, therefore, makes decisions as a central planner in an
optimal growth model. Trade between consumers of both countries,
however, takes place on competitive (spot or financial) markets. We
compare the investment-consumption decisions of both ‘market’ mod-
els with the benchmark-case of an integrated world-equilibrium. In
the log-linear case, we can uniquely characterize the state-dependent
preferences of consumers that lead to dynamically efficient investment
decisions. We show that the investment decisions in both ‘market’
models are, in general, inefficient as compared with the efficient, or
integrated world economy, case.
1 Introduction
It is a well-known fact of economic theory that an Arrow-Debreu equilib-
rium is simply a reinterpretation of the Walrasian equilibrium concept to
contingent commodities, see Arrow [1], Debreu [5], Radner [8]. Using these
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ideas one can study the allocation of risk in a general equilibrium frame-
work. Indeed in this context, complete financial markets with contingent
claims lead to Pareto-optimal allocations. Although there has been much
literature on the effect of various market structures on asset allocation and
their welfare effects in an uncertain environment, the question of capital ac-
cumulation in a dynamic general equilibrium model under uncertainty has
not been studied. For example, it is not known whether the existence of
complete financial markets, which generate Pareto-optimal allocations in the
Arrow-Debreu framework, generate efficient dynamic solutions.
Although an analysis of this question in a competitive framework remains
open due to the difficulties of studying infinite horizon general equilibrium
models, this is a natural question in the context of an optimal growth model.
Moreover, since in this type of model there must be several goods in order to
trade and several countries each deciding on their own amount of investment,
a natural setting for this question is the type of mixed economy, studied by
Datta and Mirman [4]. Indeed, in the present paper we study the effect
of financial markets on the investment of the economy when there are two
countries, two goods and two states of the world. In this context we show
that the investment cannot, in general (in particular when there exist state-
dependent preferences), be efficient –even in the face of complete financial
markets. The use of a model with each country having a mixed economy
depends on two things. The first is that each country produces and invests
(or equivalently decides on aggregate consumption of) their own good, i.e.,
makes decisions as a central planner in an optimal growth model and, the
second is, for each good (or country) there is a representative agent trading
both goods in a Walrasian context. These agents, one from each country,
use the aggregate consumption choice from the central planner as the initial
endowment in the trading environment. This use of the Walrasian paradigm
is a natural setting in which to use the Arrow-Debreu contingent claims
framework.
This type of mixed economy model was used by Datta and Mirman to
study a trade economy. Their model is without uncertainty but contains pro-
duction externalities. It was shown there that the inefficiency associated with
production externalities studied in Fischer and Mirman [6] can be mitigated
if it is possible to internalize the production externalities by trade, through
the preferences of the representative agents. In our model inefficiencies are
also generated but these are due to the uncertainty, not to production ex-
ternalities, and the assumption that tastes are state-dependent. Methods of
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Fischer and Mirman [6] are used to study these problems and are used in
this paper as well.
In this paper, as in Datta and Mirman [4], we consider the relationship
between a integrated world economy –in which there is one central planner–
and the allocations generated by various assumptions on the type of mar-
kets. In the case of these different market types, each country must have
a central planner to decide on its own aggregate consumptions and thus a
differential game is entailed. This is the dynamic investment game between
the two central planners. Indeed we study two cases of markets. The first is
complete financial markets in which risk is allocated efficiently. The second
case is when there are only spot markets –so that in general risk is not al-
located efficiently. In both cases, we find an indirect utility function which
the planners use to determine the optimal aggregate consumption for the
representative agent in their country. This optimal aggregate consumption
is used in turn by the representative agent as initial endowments in trading
with the representative agent of the other country. Each country’s represen-
tative agent takes the price as given in the trading process. However, the
central planner of each country does not take the price as given.
We restrict the analysis to a log-linear economy so that there is a (com-
putable) solution to the differentiable game between the two central planners.
We show that in the case of only spot markets allocations are only Pareto-
optimal for particular specifications of the parameters while in the complete
financial market case all allocations derived from trade are Pareto-optimal.
We compare the investment-consumption decisions of the three models and
show that the complete financial market case and the spot market case lead
to the same but inefficient investment choices, i.e., the investment choices are
different from that in the integrated world economy. This difference occurs
because in the two ‘market’ cases there appears a consumption externality.
These consumption externalities are taken account of in the case of the co-
operative solution. Therefore the market investment choices are inefficient
solutions. In fact, these inefficiencies are only possible if the preferences are
state dependent. More generally, only if the tastes of the consumers are re-
lated in a very special way –making them both essentially the same– or if the
preferences are independent of the state of the world are the ‘market’ cases
efficient. This is similar to the results of Datta and Mirman [4] where the
markets are able to internalize the production externalities under conditions
that imply similar tastes. However, in the dynamic model there are no mar-
kets to perform that function so that tastes must be ‘almost’ equivalent for
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the two countries. Finally we show how the long-run equilibrium is related
in these different cases.
The underlying static one-period models are studied Section 2. We derive
the allocation of consumption goods in the non-cooperative cases of only
spot markets (Section 2.1) and complete financial market (Section 2.2) as
well as in the cooperative case (Section 2.3). Efficiency of the allocations is
discussed in Section 2.4. In Section 3, we analyze the corresponding dynamic
cases in which the central planner in each country decides strategically on
the aggregate output, Section 3.1-3.3. Dynamic efficiency and the long-run
behavior of the equilibrium is studied in Section 3.4.
2 The One-Period Model
Consider a world economy with two countries and two goods in which con-
sumers’ endowments and tastes depend on an exogenously determined state
of nature. Each country i (i = 1, 2) is endowed with only one good i. The con-
sumers of each country, however, derive utility from consuming both goods,
in each state of nature, and thus there is an incentive to trade, on spot as
well as on financial markets. We assume that the population of each country
is large and, therefore, consumers trade on competitive markets, i.e. each
consumer takes prices as given. The time structure of trade is as follows.
Financial markets, in which assets are traded, open at the beginning of the
period, before the resolution of uncertainty. Spot markets, in which con-
sumption goods are exchanged, open after the state of the world is revealed,
and consumption takes place at the end of the period. Trading possibilities
of consumers depend on the particular markets that are available to them.
For instance, without financial markets, consumers cannot insure themselves
against endowment shocks and variations in taste because wealth cannot be
transferred across states of nature. The allocations on both the financial and
the spot markets are determined by a Walrasian equilibrium with a price-
taking representative agent in each country. This agent maximizes expected
utility when trading on the financial market and state-dependent utility when
trading on the spot market.
We consider two extreme cases. In the first case, spot markets open
in each state of the world after the resolution of uncertainty and there are
no financial markets in which consumers can insure their wealth. In the
other case, a complete financial market opens before the state of the world
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is revealed and spot markets open after the resolution of uncertainty. In the
latter case consumers can insure themselves by transferring wealth across
the states of nature. We derive the allocation of consumption goods in the
world economy at the end of the period for both cases. The allocations are
compared with the Pareto-optimal benchmark-allocation that is chosen by
a benevolent social planner to maximize weighted total utility of the world
economy.
We impose specific assumptions on the fundamentals to keep the analysis
simple and to obtain explicit solutions throughout the paper. Assume that
two states of nature s (s = 1, 2) can occur with respective probability pis > 0
(pi1 + pi2 = 1). The representative agent in country i has state-dependent
initial endowment (xi(1), xi(2)) and state-dependent preferences, described
by the utility function,
ui(s, cii, cij) = νii(s) log cii + νij(s) log cij, νii(s) > 0, νij(s) > 0, (1)
where j = 1, 2 and j != i. cij is the amount of good j consumed by the
representative agent of country i at the end of the period.
2.1 Spot Market Case
Here we derive the allocation of consumption goods among the represen-
tative agents of the two countries if there exists no financial market and
consumers can only trade on competitive spot markets after the state of
the world is observed. Assuming that consumers take prices as given, the
utility-maximization problem of the representative agent in country i is as
follows. If state s is revealed, the representative agent in country i chooses a
consumption bundle such that,
max
(cii(s)≥0, cij(s)≥0)
νii(s) log cii(s) + νij(s) log cij(s) (2)
s.t. pi(s)cii(s) + pj(s)cij(s) ≤ pi(s)xi(s),
where j = 1, 2 and j != i. For each state s, pi(s) is the spot market price of
good i, and cij(s) is the amount of good j consumed by the representative
agent in country i. xi(s) is the aggregate consumption of good i in state s as
well as the endowment of the representative agent in country i when trading
in the spot market.
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The solution to this utility maximization problem determines the demand
for goods of consumers in both countries in both states. One finds that,
cij(s) =
νij(s)
νi1(s) + νi2(s)
pi(s)
pj(s)
xi(s).
From the market-clearing condition,
c1i(s) + c2i(s) = xi(s), for i = 1, 2, (3)
we obtain the relative price p(s) = p2(s)/p1(s) that clears the market:
p(s) =
ν12(s)(ν21(s) + ν22(s))
ν21(s)(ν11(s) + ν12(s))
x1(s)
x2(s)
. (4)
The market-clearing relative price depends on the preferences of both con-
sumers in state s and on the ratio of the initial endowments in that state.
The relative price for good 2 in state s increases, if total endowment in good
2 decreases, the preference in country 2 (country 1) for the foreign good de-
creases (increases), or the preference in country 2 (country 1) for the domestic
good increases (decreases).
Thus, the allocation of consumption goods after trade is,
cSij(s) =
νji(s)
νj1(s) + νj2(s)
xj(s). (5)
The amount of good j actually consumed by the representative agent in coun-
try i is determined by the preferences of country j and the initial endowment
of country j. The share of the aggregate consumption of good j owned by
country i at the end of the period is given by the relative weight that country
j assigns to good i. Thus, from each country’s perspective, the amount of
foreign goods consumed is determined only by the foreign country’s prefer-
ences and initial endowment while the amount of domestic goods consumed
depends only on the own preferences and initial endowment.
2.2 Financial Market Case
Here, we analyze the allocation of goods when consumers have access to a
competitive financial market with a complete asset structure. In this market,
contracts are traded for the receipt and delivery of goods after the resolution
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of uncertainty. Therefore, consumers can transfer wealth across states before
the state of the world is revealed. After the uncertainty is resolved, deliveries
and receipts of goods take place according to the portfolio of assets that con-
sumers hold and, afterwards, spot markets for both goods open. Given their
wealth in the prevailing state of nature, consumers finally allocate goods for
consumption by trading in the spot market. It is assumed that consumers
perfectly anticipate the spot prices while trading on the financial market. It
is a well-known result, [1, 8], that this allocation of goods is identical to the
one derived when consumers trade on a complete market for contingent com-
modities at the beginning of the period and no spot markets open afterwards.
This is an implication of the Pareto-optimality of allocations, which holds if
financial markets are complete. A detailed discussion is given in Section 2.4.
Due to analytical tractability, we resort to this Arrow-Debreu framework in
the following. We assume that the representative agent has objective proba-
bilities and maximizes expected utility when trading in the financial market.
Therefore the agent chooses a bundle of contingent commodities as follows,
max
(cii(s)≥0,cij(s)≥0)s=1,2
2∑
s=1
pis (νii(s) log cii(s) + νij(s) log cij(s)), (6)
s.t.
2∑
s=1
(pi(s)cii(s) + pj(s)cij(s)) ≤
2∑
s=1
pi(s)xi(s).
Here cij(s) is the amount of good j the representative agent i consumes in
state s. The state-dependent aggregate consumption at the end of the period
is xi(s), i = 1, 2.
The solution to the expected utility maximization problem (6) is,
cij(s) =
pis νij(s)
E(νi1 + νi2)
wi
pj(s)
=: aij(s)
wi
pj(s)
, (7)
where Eνij = pi1νij(1) + pi2νij(2), denotes the mean value of country i’s pref-
erences for good j, and wi = pi(1)xi(1) + pi(2)xi(2), is the wealth of country
i while trading in contingent commodities.
To calculate the market-clearing prices, we insert the demand for contin-
gent commodities (7) into the condition of market clearance cii(s) + cji(s) =
xi(s), for i, j, s = 1, 2 and j != i. By (7), the market-clearing condition is
equivalent to,
aii(s)wi + aji(s)wj = xi(s) pi(s). (8)
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We take good 1 in state 1 as numeraire, normalizing prices by p1(1) = 1. It
is straightforward to check that solving (8) for the market-clearing prices is
equivalent to solving the affine system,

 a11(1) a21(1) a21(1)a12(1) a22(1)− 1 a22(1)
a11(2)− 1 a21(2) a21(2)




x1(2)
x1(1)
p1(2)
x2(1)
x1(1)
p2(1)
x2(2)
x1(1)
p2(2)

 =

 1− a11(1)−a12(1)
−a11(2)

 .
The solution to this system is,
pi(s) = dis
x1(1)
xi(s)
i, s = 1, 2, (9)
where the coefficients dis depend only on the constants aij(s). One has,
d11 = 1
d12 =
pi2
pi1
ν21(2)E(ν11 + ν12)− pi1 [ν11(1)ν21(2)− ν11(2)ν21(1)]
ν21(1)E(ν11 + ν12) + pi2 [ν11(1)ν21(2)− ν11(2)ν21(1)]
d21 =
ν22(1)Eν12 + ν12(1)Eν21
ν21(1)E(ν11 + ν12) + pi2 [ν11(1)ν21(2)− ν11(2)ν21(1)]
d22 =
pi2
pi1
ν22(2)Eν12 + ν12(2)Eν21
ν21(1)E(ν11 + ν12) + pi2 [ν11(1)ν21(2)− ν11(2)ν21(1)]
The allocation of consumption goods in equilibrium is therefore given by,
cFij(s) =
pis νij(s)
E(νi1 + νi2)
di1 + di2
djs
xj(s). (10)
In the financial market case, the amount of good j actually consumed by
the representative agent in country i in state s depends on the preferences
of both countries as well as on the probability of the state and the initial
endowment xj(s).
2.3 Cooperative Case
We derive the optimal cooperative solution next. In this case, a single benev-
olent planner chooses a feasible state-dependent allocation of consumption
goods for both representative agents. The objective of the planner is to
maximizes the weighted sum of the expected utilities of the agents in both
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countries. Neither financial nor spot markets open in the cooperative case.
The allocation, which is Pareto-optimal, and the associated utility levels pro-
vides an important benchmark for the market cases. One can thus determine
whether the allocation in the world economy is a social optimum. The prob-
lem of the planner is to choose an allocation after the state is revealed to
maximize the sum of the weighted utility of both representative agents in
that state.
Given aggregate consumption levels (x1(s), x2(s))s=1,2 in the two coun-
tries, the objective of the social planner is to choose a feasible allocation
cij(s), i, j, s = 1, 2 such that,
max
(cij(s)≥0)i,j,s=1,2
2∑
i,j,s=1
pis µi νij(s) log cij(s),
s.t. cii(s) + cji(s) ≤ xi(s), for all i, j, s = 1, 2, j != i.
µi > 0 is the relative weight assigned to the representative agent of country
i. Let µ = µ1, and µ2 = 1− µ.
The solution to this maximization problem is,
cCij(s) =
µi νij(s)
µ1 ν1j(s) + µ2 ν2j(s)
xj(s). (11)
This allocation is Pareto-optimal for any weight. The share of aggregate
consumption of good j in country i is determined by the weighted prefer-
ence of the representative agent in country i for good j relative to the total
weighted preference of both countries for that good. The country with the
higher weighted preference for a good obtains the larger share.
2.4 Efficiency of Allocations
We can now study the efficiency of the outcome in the two market cases.
We compare the competitive equilibrium in each of the market cases to the
solution in the benchmark case. Since the allocations in all three cases are
generically different, it is, in general, not of interest to compare the resulting
allocations in these three cases directly. More important are the welfare
aspects associated with the different market structures.
It is a well-known result that the allocation derived in the case of complete
competitive financial markets is Pareto-optimal. At least one consumer is
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reluctant to agree to a different allocation of consumption goods (or initial
endowments) in any such equilibrium: there is no redistribution of goods
such that at least one consumer is better off and the other consumer is not
worse off. The cooperative case obviously also generates a Pareto-optimal
allocation. However, if consumers can only trade on spot markets after the
state of the world is revealed, the allocation is, in general, not Pareto-optimal.
Thus, there may be an incentive for both representative agents to agree to a
redistribution of goods, or to favor the introduction of financial markets.
It is of interest to know whether the state-dependence of preferences or
endowments causes the inefficiency of the spot-market outcome. Assume
that the preferences are independent of the state. Then, as elementary cal-
culations show, the allocations in the spot market and the financial market
case are identical in this example, i.e. cSij(s) = c
F
ij(s) for all i, j, s = 1, 2.
Therefore, the lack of Pareto-optimality of the spot market allocation can be
only due to the state-dependence of preferences.
However, the outcome of the no-financial-market case is not generically
inefficient as the following result shows.
Lemma 2.1 The allocation (cSij(s))i,j,s=1,2 in the spot market case is Pareto-
optimal if and only if the preferences of the representative agents in both
countries satisfy
ν12(1)
ν12(2)
=
ν21(1)
ν21(2)
(12)
Proof. It suffices to show that there exists a weight µ such that the alloca-
tion in the spot market case is identical to that in the cooperative case. Then
Pareto-optimality of the spot market allocation follows readily. An elemen-
tary calculation shows that cSij(s) = c
C
ij(s) for all i, j, s = 1, 2 if and only if (12)
is satisfied. The weight is given by µ/(1−µ) = ν21(1)/ν12(1) = ν21(2)/ν12(2).
!
Lemma 2.1 states that even when consumers do not have access to a
financial market, the allocation of goods derived only through trade in spot
markets is efficient, provided that the relative preference for the foreign good
in the states of nature is identical in both countries. This holds in particular
if the preference for the foreign good does not depend on the state of nature
in both countries. The relative taste for the domestic good, however, may
vary with the state.
Pareto-optimality in the spot market case has important implications. If
the prevailing allocation is Pareto-optimal, at least one representative agent
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is reluctant to trade in the financial market; he offers his good only in the
spot market after the state is observed. According to Lemma 2.1, trade of
both agents in the financial market would lead to a different Pareto-optimal
allocation, leaving one consumer with a lower level of utility. One might
object that this situation is not of importance, because condition (12) only
holds on a subset of the parameter space of Lebesgue-measure zero, i.e. it is
the generic case that (12) does not hold. However, Pareto-optimality of the
spot-market allocation is not necessary to observe opposition of one agent
to the creation of financial markets. One has the following technical result
which shows that opening a financial market in addition to spot markets is
not necessarily welfare-improving.
Lemma 2.2 There exists a set N ⊂ R8++ of positive Lebesgue-measure such
that for each (νij(s))i,j,s=1,2 ∈ N one agent prefers not to trade in the financial
market.
Proof. We show that the creation of a financial market makes one agent
worse off for all preferences (νij(s))i,j,s=1,2 ∈ N , where N is a set of positive
Lebesgue-measure which contains an element that fulfills (12). The proof
uses a continuity argument.
Fix preference parameters, ν¯ := (νij(s))i,j,s=1,2 ∈ R8++, such that (12)
holds and that the allocations in the spot and financial market case are
different and lead to different levels of utility. Let the representative agent in
country 1 be better off in the financial market case than in the spot market
case. Thus agent 2 is against the opening of the financial market.
For all parameters close to the initial parameter ν¯, the utility of each
agent is close to his initial utility. This follows from continuity of allocations
and utility in (νij(s))i,j,s=1,2 ∈ R8++. Therefore, if N ⊂ R8++ is a (sufficiently
small) neighborhood of ν¯, agent 1 is better off with financial market, but
agent 2 is better off without financial market. !
3 The Dynamic Model
In the previous section, we studied the effect of different markets on the
allocation of consumption goods in the one-period world economy. In this
static model, the initial endowment was completely consumed in the respec-
tive state at the end of the period. In what follows, we extend the analysis to
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a world economy with production and an infinite planning-horizon. If con-
sumption goods are perishable and consumers have access to a production
technology, consumers with a planning-horizon of more than one period have
an incentive to save, because their investments generate consumption goods
in the subsequent period. We need to specify how the investment decisions
are made in each period. In our model, country i owns the capital stock of
good i and specializes in the production of good i. Thus country i’s total pro-
duction determines the aggregate consumption of good i in any period. Its
savings determine future consumption. Therefore, country i has an incentive
to exercise market power in any market for good i. The goal of this section
is to analyze the effect of different markets in this infinite-horizon optimal
growth model with strategic interaction of both countries. The results in the
static cases are used in the further analysis.
Due to the fact that each country is a monopolist for the good it supplies,
we postulate the following structure in the process of decision making. In
each country decisions are made at two distinct levels. On the one hand,
there is a central planner in each country who chooses the amount of invest-
ment in each period and each state of the world. His objective is to maximize
the discounted sum of utilities of the representative agent in his country over
an infinite horizon. The planners’ decisions, therefore, determine aggregate
consumption of the respective goods in all states of the world and all periods.
The savings are used as input for production, yielding consumption goods
in the subsequent period. On the other hand, there are competitive (finan-
cial or spot) markets in each period which determine the allocation of the
aggregate consumption between the two countries at the end of that period.
The consumption good is perishable and all trades have to be fulfilled within
one period; we exclude contracts with maturity after the recent period. We
restrict our analysis to two extreme cases, which have also been studied in
the one-period model: the sole presence of spot markets and the existence of
a complete financial market.
When trading in the financial and spot markets, the representative agent
in each country takes as given the aggregate consumption decision of the
planner. As in the one-period case, this agent maximizes expected utility
when trading on the financial market and state-dependent utility when trad-
ing on the spot market. In this process an indirect utility function for the
representative agent in each country is derived. The indirect utility depends
on prices and the initial endowment (the state-dependent aggregate con-
sumption choices of the planner) of the representative agent as well as on
12
the available markets (and asset structure). In each single period, prices are
determined by the process of market clearing and therefore depend on the
decisions of both planners. Thus, the allocation of the two goods at the end
of each period is determined in a non-strategic fashion by the representative
agents in the two countries, given the choice of the planner. Each planner,
however, makes a strategic decision that takes account of both the trading
decisions of the representative agent and the equilibrium price mechanism on
financial and spot markets, given the other planner’s policy.
Let us give a formal description of the above model. Denote by kit the
capital stock of country i at beginning of period t. The initial capital stock
is ki0 > 0. If xit(s) is the state-dependent aggregate consumption of good i
in period t, then,
ki(t+1) = fi(s, kit)− xit(s)
is the investment choice, i.e. the capital stock at the beginning of period t+1
of country i if state s is revealed at time t. We assume that the exogenous
production shock is an independent and identically distributed sequence of
random variables.
The policy decision of the planner in country i is a sequence of state-
dependent aggregate consumptions {xit ∈ R2+ | t ≥ 0}. The indirect utility
of the representative agent in period t is given by the one-period utility intro-
duced in Section 2. Let us focus on the financial market case, see Section 2.2
for the associated one-period model. The planner in each country is assumed
to know the process of price-formation and thus perceives the associated
equilibrium consumptions cFijt(s) as a function of the state-dependent aggre-
gate consumptions (x1t, x2t) ∈ R4+. The planner in country i therefore knows
the effect of his decision on the indirect utility of the representative agent in
period t which is given by,
νFi (xit, xjt) =
2∑
s=1
pis ui(s, c
F
i1t(s), c
F
i2t(s)),
where cFijt(s) is given by the outcome in the respective one-period case, see
(10). Under our specifications, cFijt(s) is uniquely determined by the prefer-
ences and the aggregate consumptions (x1t, x2t) ∈ R4+.
The planners are strategic, taking account of the effect of their decision on
the market-clearing prices through the effect of the representative agent’s ex-
pected utility. However, the appearance of xjt in the indirect utility function
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of the representative agent of country i represents a consumption external-
ity because xjt is the state-dependent aggregate consumption decision of the
planner in country j.
In order to the write down the intertemporal maximization problem of
the planner we introduce some notation. Let (Ω,F ,P) = (S∞,B(S)∞,pi∞),
S = {1, 2} denote the sample-path space of the exogenous shock. ω(t) ∈ S is
the production shock at time t. As above, we refer to these shocks as s ∈ S
whenever atemporal aspects of the model are considered; no confusion should
arise in what follows. For each t, Ft ⊂ F is the σ-algebra containing the
information on the shock up to (and including) time t. The planner chooses
the state-dependent investment in any period t, given the information up
to time t. Formally, a policy is a family of functions {xit : Ω → R+ | t ≥
0}, which is measurable with respect to Ft, i.e., xit depends only on the
realization of shocks up to time t.
Planner i chooses a policy that maximizes the discounted sum of indirect
utilities, given the the other country’s policy. Denoting the discount factor
in country i by δi, the planner solves the problem,
max
{xit:Ω→R | t≥0}
E
∞∑
t=0
δti ν
F
i (xit, xjt) (13)
s.t. ki(t+1) = fi(ω(t), kit)− xit,
0 ≤ xit ≤ fi(ω(t), kit), for all ω ∈ Ω, t ≥ 0,
given initial condition ki0(ω−1) ≡ ki0 > 0. For each t ≥ 0, kit is a random
variable which is measurable with respect to Ft−1.
The utility derived by the agent in country i depends on the choices of
the planners in both countries. This creates the possibility of strategic inter-
action. The strategic interaction comes through the process of equilibrium
price formation on both financial and spot markets. In this form, the model
is a differential game between the two planners.
In order to solve this game in stationary strategies and to obtain a closed-
form solution, we assume that the stochastic production function of country
i is given by
fi(s, ki) = k
αi(s)
i , 0 < αi(s) < 1.
A stationary strategy is a policy that depends only on the beginning-of-
period capital stocks and on the possible realization of the state of the world
in the recent period.
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Definition 3.1 A pair of functions x1, x2 : S×R2+ → R+ is a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium in stationary strategies, if xi is an optimal policy for planner i
given the jth planners policy xj, for i, j = 1, 2 and j != i.
We determine policies which constitute a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in
stationary strategies using stochastic dynamic programming and deriving a
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. Let us discuss both spot and financial
market case in turn.
3.1 Spot Market Case
In the spot market case, the indirect utility of the representative consumer
in country i in state s, which is perceived by the planner in country i as a
function of the aggregate consumption of both countries, is,
νSi (s, xi, xj) = η
S
ij(s) + νii(s) log xi(s) + νij(s) log xj(s),
j != i, where
ηSij(s) = νii(s) log
νii(s)
νii(s) + νij(s)
+ νij(s) log
νij(s)
νii(s) + νij(s)
+(−1)i νij(s) log ν12(s)(ν21(s) + ν22(s))
ν21(s)(ν11(s) + ν12(s))
,
see the corresponding one-period case, Section 2.3.
The objective of the planner in country i is to adopt a policy that max-
imizes the discounted sum of utilities of the representative agent, given the
policy of the other country’s planner. In each period, the planner makes
his investment decision after the state of the world is known. However, the
uncertainty in production implies that the endowment at the end of the next
period is unknown at the time of decision making. The maximization prob-
lem of the planner is,
max
(xit:Ω→R)t≥0
E
∞∑
t=0
δti ν
S
i (ω(t), xit, xjt) (14)
s.t. ki(t+1) = k
αi(ω(t))
it − xit,
0 ≤ xit ≤ kαi(ω(t))it , for all ω ∈ Ω, t ≥ 0.
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We show next that a policy of choosing a state-dependent fraction of own
output as aggregate consumption in every period is a Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium in stationary strategies. That is, in equilibrium, planner i chooses
xi(s, k1t, k2t) to be a linear function of fi(s, kit) such that, in particular,
xi(s, k1t, k2t) is independent of the foreign countries capital stock kjt. Adapt-
ing the technique of Fischer and Mirman [6] to compute a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium, we proceed as follows. First, assume that a stationary value
function Vi(s, ki) exists. Then the principle of optimality implies,
Vi(s, ki) = max
0≤xi≤kαi(s)i
{
ηSij(s) + νii(s) log xi + νij(s) log xj
+δi
2∑
s˜=1
pis˜ Vi(s˜, k
αi(s)
i − xi)
}
. (15)
By extrapolating from the corresponding finite-horizon version of the
model, we assume a log-linear functional form,
Vi(s, ki, kj) = Ai(s) log ki + Di(s), (16)
where Ai(s), and Di(s) depend only on the parameters of the model.
We demonstrate next that the value function (16) actually solves the
functional equation (15). Assuming (16), the first-order condition yields,
xi(s) =
νii(s)
νii(s) + δi E(αi Ai)
kαi(s)i ,
which shows that, in equilibrium, planner i chooses xi(s, k1t, k2t) to be a
linear function of its countries state-dependent aggregate output.
Now, one can check that this stationary policy actually solves the Bellman
equation (15), where the parameter Ai still has to be determined. Inserting
the expression for the policy xi(s, k1, k2) into the optimality condition and
then equating coefficients of log(ki), one finds,
Ai(s) = νii(s) + δi E(αi Ai),
and some expression for Di(s), which is not needed for the further analysis.
We finally derive a closed-form solution for the optimal policy,
xi(s, k1, k2) = γ
S
i (s) k
αi(s)
i , (17)
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where the state-dependent optimal consumption-output ratio γSi (s) is given
by,
γSi (s) =
(
1 +
δi
νii(s)
E(νiiαi)
1− δi Eαi
)−1
. (18)
It important to note that the optimal policy of the planner in country i
is independent of the policy of the planner in country j. This leads to the
following result.
Proposition 3.2 The choice of investing a state-dependent proportion of
capital stock, 1 − γSi (s), in every period by the planner in the country i,
where γSi (s) is given by (18), is the unique subgame-perfect Cournot-Nash
equilibrium in stationary strategies for the dynamic spot market case.
3.2 Financial Market Case
In the financial market case, the indirect utility of the representative agent
in country i perceived by the planner is, cf. Section 2.2,
νFi (xi, xj) = η
F
ij +
2∑
s=1
pis (νii(s) log xi(s) + νij(s) log xj(s)),
where
ηFij =
2∑
s=1
pis
[
νii(s) log
(
aii(s)
di1 + di2
dis
)
+ νij(s) log
(
aij(s)
di1 + di2
djs
)]
.
We proceed analogously to the spot market case, Section 3.1, to solve the
stochastic dynamic optimization problem (13). It is straightforward to show
that the optimal consumption policy is,
xi(s) = γ
F
i (s) k
αi(s)
i , (19)
where
γFi (s) =
(
1 +
δi
νii(s)
E(νiiαi)
1− δi Eαi
)−1
(20)
As in the dynamic spot market case, we find that the optimal policy of
the planner in country i is independent of the policy of the planner in coun-
try j. We therefore get the analogous result to Proposition 3.2: Investing
a state-dependent proportion of capital stock, 1 − γFi (s), in every period in
country i is the unique subgame-perfect Cournot-Nash equilibrium in sta-
tionary strategies for the dynamic financial market case.
17
3.3 Cooperative Case
To have a benchmark for the two dynamic cases analyzed in the previous
sections, we derive the world equilibrium in the dynamic case next. In this
equilibrium neither financial nor spot markets open. The integrated world
equilibrium is the optimal cooperative equilibrium maximizing the weighted
sum of the discounted expected utilities of the agents in the two countries.
The objective of the single benevolent planner in the world is to choose
feasible state-dependent aggregate consumptions in the two countries as well
as an allocation of consumption goods for the representative agents in each
country, for every period t, to maximize the weighted sum of the discounted
expected utilities in both countries. This and the next section also extend
the Brock and Mirman [3] analysis to a particular two-sector economy.
For any given aggregate consumption decision, the allocation of the con-
sumption goods, in each period, solves the corresponding one-period maxi-
mization problem. Using (11), we find the indirect utility function,
νC(s, x1, x2) = η +
2∑
i=1
(µ1 ν1i(s) + µ2 ν2i(s)) log xi(s),
where η =
∑2
i,j,s=1
µiνij(s)
µ1ν1j(s)+µ2ν2j(s)
.
Since the planner first observes the state s and then decides on aggregate
consumption and allocation, the optimization problem is as follows. For
simplicity, we assume that δ1 = δ2 = δ.
max
(x1t,x2t:Ω→R)
E
∞∑
t=0
δt νC(ω(t), x1t, x2t)
s.t. 0 ≤ xit ≤ kαi(ω(t))it ,
ki(t+1) = k
αi(ω(t))
it − xit, i = 1, 2, for all ω ∈ Ω, t ≥ 0.
We proceed analogously to the spot market case. However, in the present
case, the value function depends on the capital stock in both countries. We
make the guess,
V (s, ki, kj) = A(s) log ki + B(s) log kj + D(s). (21)
It is then straightforward to find the optimal consumption policy,
xi(s) = γ
C
i (s) k
αi(s)
i , (22)
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where the consumption-output ratio in the efficient integrated world equilib-
rium for good i = 1, 2 is given by,
γCi (s) =
(
1 +
δ
µ ν1i(s) + (1− µ) ν2i(s)
E([µ ν1i + (1− µ) ν2i]αi)
1− δ Eαi
)−1
(23)
3.4 Dynamic Efficiency of Allocations
Dynamic efficiency of allocations requires that the share of the total stock of
capital extracted in every period is identical to the benchmark consumption
rate in the cooperative world-equilibrium. It is clear from our analysis that,
given aggregate consumptions, the allocation of consumption goods in any
period is identical to that derived in the one-period case. The Cournot-Nash
equilibrium in stationary strategies, derived above for both non-cooperative
cases, are compared to the cooperative benchmark-case. We assume that
time preferences in both countries are equal, i.e. δ1 = δ2 = δ.
The optimal aggregate consumption in each period, which is determined
strategically by the planners, defines a stochastic law of motion for each coun-
tries’ capital stock. For instance, in the financial market case, Section 3.2,
the evolution of the capital stock of country i is described by the stochastic
process,
ki(t+1) = (1− γFi (ω(t))) kαi(ω(t))it ,
where ω(t) is the realization of the state in period t, and 1 − γFi (s) is the
optimal state-dependent investment-output ratio in state s, or saving rate, for
short. We refer to γ·i, the optimal consumption-output ratio in the respective
case, as the consumption rate in the following.
Let us compare first the consumption rates in the non-cooperative cases.
Inspecting equations (18) and (20), one finds,
Lemma 3.3 The consumption rate (and, thus, the saving rate) is identical
in the spot market case and financial market case, i.e. γSi (s) = γ
F
i (s) for
s = 1, 2 and i = 1, 2.
This result says that the planners’ decision is independent of the partic-
ular markets that are available to consumers. The amount of the domestic
good extracted in every period by each countries planner is the same in both
the spot and the financial market case. In particular, the amount of resources
extracted every period does not depend on the availability of a financial mar-
ket in which consumers can insure their wealth.
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The key to understanding why the planners choice is the same regard-
less of consumers particular trading possibilities is the maximization problem
solved by each planner. Inspection of the indirect utility function that are
perceived by the planner in each country yields the following observation.
Maximizing the sum of discounted expected utilities in the financial market
case, in which the indirect utility function is given by νFi (xi, xj), yields the
same (optimal) choice as maximizing with respect to the indirect utility func-
tion
∑
s ν
S
i (s, xi, xj) derived from the spot market case. Since the expected
utility
∑
s ν
S
i (s, xi, xj) is maximal if and only if the state-dependent utility
νSi (s, xi, xj) is maximal for both states, the optimal choice is identical in the
spot market and the financial market case. Note that in both the spot mar-
ket case and the complete financial market case, the optimal consumption of
each representative agent depends only on the aggregate consumption of his
own good. However, the prices depend on the aggregate consumption of both
goods. This is true in each state of the world. The planners are assumed
to take account of the price formation process. This creates a consump-
tion externality for each planner. However the properties of the utility and
production functions in our model ensure that the consumption externality
plays no role in the optimal choice, i.e., the optimal policies are in dominant
strategies. It turns out that the optimal aggregate consumption choice of the
planner in each country is a constant multiple of the stock of the good in
that country. Although in the two market cases these multiples are different,
due to our assumptions on the utility and production functions, they play no
role in the dynamic (aggregate consumption) decisions. Therefore, we may
conclude that in our model trading possibilities only effect the allocation of
consumption goods within each period, but do not change the saving rate.
In the cooperative case the optimal consumptions also depend on the ag-
gregate consumptions of both countries, as in the market cases. However, the
dynamic decisions are different in the cooperative case since their the single
central planner takes account of the consumption externality. Thus, these
consumption externalities are ‘internalized’ by the single central planner.
This internalizing of the consumption externalities yields efficient solutions,
which can not be duplicated in the market cases unless the preferences are
the independent of the state of the world or are essentially the same, but not
necessarily identical, across consumers.
In order to illustrate these differences, we compare next the consump-
tion rates in the non-cooperative cases and the cooperative case. Figure 1
illustrates the stochastic law of motion in the financial market case and the
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Figure 1: Illustration of the stochastic laws of motion for both goods in the
financial market case and the cooperative case.
cooperative case. Parameters are fixed as follows: µ = .5, δ = .95, pi1 = .25,
αi(s) ≡ .5, ν11(1) = .1, ν11(2) = .4, ν12(1) = .9, ν12(2) = .6, and ν2i(s) ≡ .5.
In particular, the preferences of the representative agent in country 2 do not
depend on the state. For these parameters, the laws of motion correspond-
ing to the consumption rates have the following order (from top to bottom):
γF1 (1), γ
C
1 (1), γ
C
1 (2), γ
F
1 (2) (left-hand side) and γ
C
2 (2), γ
F
2 (1) = γ
F
2 (2), γ
C
2 (1)
(right-hand side). Therefore, one finds that γF1 (1) < γ
C
1 (1) < γ
C
1 (2) < γ
F
1 (2),
and γC2 (2) < γ
F
2 (2) = γ
F
2 (1) < γ
C
2 (1). Since the exponent αi(s) is identical
in all cases, one finds that for any fixed capital stock in period t, the capital
stock in the subsequent period t + 1 is the larger, the larger the saving rate
(i.e. the smaller the consumption rate).
In the example, the most extreme saving rates for good 1 occurs in the
financial market case. In this case, the saving rate for good 1 is largest in
state 1 and smallest in state 2. The saving rate in the cooperative case lies
between these rates, but are larger in state 1 than in state 2. In the long-
run, one therefore observes a larger fluctuation of the capital stock of good
1 in the financial market case than in the cooperative case. The saving rate
for good 2 shows a different pattern. Here, the saving rates in the financial
market case are independent of the state. The saving rate in the cooperative
case, however, varies with the state. It is smallest in state 1 and largest in
state 2. For good 2, one therefore observes fluctuations of the capital stock
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only in the cooperative case, while in the financial market case the capital
stock converges to a nonstochastic steady state in the long-run.
The over- resp. underconsumption in both goods relative to the cooper-
ative case has the following causes. On the one hand, consumers in country
2 have state-independent preferences. The optimal choice of the planner
is therefore to extract a fixed, i.e. state-independent, fraction of the total
capital stock in each period. Consumers in country 1, on the other hand,
have preferences that vary with the state. Since the planner in country
2 makes a different choice than a single world-planner, who would extract
a state-dependent share of good 2, the planner in country 1 compensates
for the relative over/undersupply of good 2 by extracting a smaller/larger
share of its good in the respective state. In the cooperative case, the saving
rates for good 1 and good 2 have a different order with respect to the state:
γC1 (1) < γ
C
1 (2), and γ
C
2 (1) > γ
C
2 (2).
If we change parameters such that ν11(1) = .3, and ν21(1) = .9, ceteris
paribus, we find that γF1 (1) < γ
C
1 (2) < γ
F
1 (2) < γ
C
1 (1). The relation of
consumption rates for good 2 are unchanged. For these parameters, the
highest capital stocks of good 1 are observed in the financial market case,
while the lowest ones occur in the cooperative case. We discuss in more
detail the relation of the empirical distribution of the capital stocks in both
non-cooperative and cooperative case at the end of this section.
Some comments on the relation of the saving rates and the correlation
of preferences and production shocks are in order. Inspecting the defining
equations for the consumption rates, it is clear that there is an unambiguous
relation. If the shock αi to the production of good i and the preference of
country i for the domestic good are positively (negatively) correlated, then all
consumption rates for good i are lower (higher) than in the uncorrelated case.
Moreover, in the cooperative case, the consumption rate is lower (higher)
than in the uncorrelated case, if the preference of country j for the foreign
good is positively (negatively) correlated with the production shock αi.
The numerical example illustrates that the saving rate in the non-cooper-
ative cases is, in general, different to that in the cooperative case. In such
a situation, the allocation of goods cannot be dynamically efficient. We
characterize next the situation in which the saving rate in the stationary
Cournot-Nash equilibrium in both non-cooperative cases is identical to that
in the cooperative world-equilibrium.
Proposition 3.4 The saving rate of good i in the stationary Cournot-Nash
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equilibrium in both non-cooperative cases is equal to the saving rate in the
cooperative case if and only if
νii(1)
νji(1)
=
νii(2)
νji(2)
(24)
where i, j = 1, 2, and j != i.
Proof. It is a simple exercise to check that the consumption rates defined
in (20) and (23) are identical, if and only if (24) holds. !
This result ensures that the saving rate for good i in the non-cooperative
Cournot-Nash equilibrium in both the spot-market and the financial-market
case is efficient, if and only if the ratio of the preference of the two countries
for good i is the same across states. However, it is important to point out
that efficiency of the saving rate and efficiency of the spot-market allocation
in each period is not related: either of the conditions (12) and (24) can be
fulfilled while the other is not satisfied.
If preferences of consumers exhibit constant returns for each state of the
world, i.e. νii(s) + νij(s) = 1 for all i, j, s = 1, 2, and j != i, then (24) is
equivalent to the condition that preferences of both consumers are identical.
Suppose the preferences of the representative agents in both countries for
good i do not depend on the state. Then the saving rate of good i is efficient,
i.e. it is identical to the saving rate in the cooperative case, Moreover, in this
case the saving rate is also independent of the state and the allocation of
consumption goods is Pareto-optimal, cf. Lemma 2.1.
We have already noted that the occurrence of country j’s decision in the
indirect utility function used by planner i to determine his optimal strategic
decision represents a consumption externality. The process of strategic in-
teraction internalizes this externality, if the ratio of the preference of the two
countries for good i is the same across states. In any other case, the world
economy fails to internalize this externality in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
This observation has also been made by Datta and Mirman [4, Prop. 3] for
state-independent preferences.
Let us study in detail the case in which the ratio of the preference of the
two countries for good i differs across states, i.e. the case in which condition
(24) does not hold.
Proposition 3.5 Suppose that
νii(s)
νji(s)
>
νii(s˜)
νji(s˜)
(25)
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for some s, s˜ = 1, 2, s != s˜. Then there is overconsumption (undercon-
sumption) of good i in the non-cooperative case in state s (state s˜), i.e.
γFi (s) > γ
C
i (s) (γ
F
i (s˜) < γ
C
i (s˜)) for any weight µ ∈ (0, 1), if and only if (25)
holds.
Proof. Again it is left to the reader as an easy exercise to check that the
consumption rates defined in (20) and (23) have the claimed property, if and
only if (25) holds. !
This result shows that if preferences do not satisfy (24) then there is either
overconsumption or underconsumption in the sense that aggregate consump-
tion is lower/higher than in the cooperative case. Proposition 3.5 further
ensures that it is not possible to have either over- or underconsumption in
both states. If the saving rate is not efficient, then, in one state of nature,
there is overconsumption whereas there is underconsumption in the other
state. However, it may well be that the saving rate of one good is efficient,
while it is inefficient for the other good.
We close the section with a discussion on the relation of the empirical
distribution of the capital stocks in the two cases. In the non-cooperative
cases, the consumption rate γSi (s) = γ
F
i (s) depends only on the preferences
of country i for the domestic good. However, the consumption rate γCi (s)
in the efficient case depends on the preferences of both countries for good
i. Therefore, there is no general relation between these consumption rates
across ’market’ cases as well as across goods and, thus, the time-series of
the capital stocks are not related in a particular way. The only relation that
holds can be drawn from Propositions 3.4 and 3.5: The consumption rates for
each good i satisfy γFi (s) ≥ γCi (s), and γFi (s˜) ≤ γCi (s˜), for some s, s˜ = 1, 2,
s != s˜.
To further analyze the empirical distribution we need some notation. It is
straightforward to check that, for each fixed state s, the map k *→ hFi (s, k) =
(1 − γFi (s)) kαi(s), which is derived from the stochastic law of motion, has
a unique positive fixed point. Denote the fixed points for s = 1, 2 by ki
and ki, where ki ≤ ki. Since hFi (s, k) is concave and increasing, the interval
GFi = [ki, ki] is forward-invariant under the stochastic law of motion, i.e.
hFi (1, G
F
i ) ∪ hFi (2, GFi ) ⊂ GFi . The same arguments apply in the cooperative
case, yielding a forward-invariant interval GCi . In the long-run, the time-series
of the capital stock of good i is in GFi resp. G
C
i (if the intervals are proper). It
can further be shown, see Schenk–Hoppe´ and Schmalfuss [9], that the time-
series of each of the two capital stocks are identical in the long-run for all
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positive initial capital stocks. In particular the empirical distribution is well-
defined, i.e., independent of the initial capital stock, see also Mirman [7]. The
support of the empirical measure is a subset of the forward-invariant interval,
defined above. The relation between the consumption rates, stated above,
implies that GFi ∩GCi != ∅. Therefore, in the long run, capital stocks in one
case cannot be systematically higher than in the other case. However, the
lowest resp. highest capital stocks observed in the long run may be associated
with one of the cases, non-cooperative or cooperative.
It might be of independent interest to note that the support of the em-
pirical measure is either a compact interval (here, GFi resp. G
C
i ) or a Cantor
set. The latter case is observed if hFi (1, G
F
i )∩hFi (2, GFi ) = ∅. This result can
be derived completely analogous to the corresponding case in the theory of
Iterated Function Systems, see e.g. Barnsley [2, Chap. 4.5].
References
[1] K. J. Arrow, Le roˆle de valeurs boursie`res pour la re`partition la meilleure
des risques. Econome´trie (1953), 41–48. Translated as: The role of securi-
ties in the optimal allocation of risk-bearing, Review of Economic Studies
31 (1964) 91–96.
[2] M. Barnsley, Fractals Everywhere, New York: Academic Press (1988).
[3] W. Brock and L. J. Mirman, Optimal economic growth and uncertainty:
the discounted case, Journal of Economic Theory 4 (1972) 479–513.
[4] M. Datta and L. J. Mirman, Dynamic externalities and policy coordina-
tion, Review of International Economics 8 (2000) 44–59.
[5] G. Debreu, Theory of Value, New York: Wiley (1959).
[6] R. D. Fischer and L. J. Mirman, Strategic dynamic interaction, Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control 16 (1992) 267–287.
[7] L. J. Mirman, The steady state behavior of a class of one sector growth
models with uncertain technology, Journal of Economic Theory 6 (1973)
219–242.
25
[8] R. Radner, Equilibrium under uncertainty. Chapter 20 in Handbook of
Mathematical Economics, ed. K. J. Arrow and M. D. Intriligator, Volume
II, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 923–1006 (1982).
[9] K. R. Schenk–Hoppe´ and B. Schmalfuss, Random fixed points in a
stochastic Solow growth model, Working Paper No. 65, Institute for Em-
pirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, November 2000, re-
vised version.
26
